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Abstract
Within public administration and policy
sciences the concept of policy networks
nowadays is well accepted. Not much atten-
tion has been paid so far to strategies aimed
at institutional design. Therefore, in this
article, we develop a conceptual framework
to study institutional design more thoroughly.
We do this by specifying the nature and
variety of institutional rules that guide the
behaviour of actors within networks. Given
this categorization of rules, we identify
possible strategies to change network rules.
Next, we focus on the strategic context of
attempts to influence the nature of institu-
tional rules: the process of institutional
design. We conclude with suggestions to
apply the conceptual framework to empirical
research into the forms, impacts and im-
plications of attempts to change the
institutional features of policy networks.
Key words
Institutional design, networks, network man-
agement, rules, institutions, complex
decision-making
Vol. 8 Issue 1 2006 141 – 160
Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online
 2006 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/14719030500518915
INTRODUCTION: REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
IN NETWORK THEORY
In our present, complex societies, policies are developed within complex networks of
interdependent actors. These networks have important impacts on the way policies
develop and on the kind of policies that come about (Hanf and Scharpf 1978; O’Toole
1988; Rhodes 1988).
Two managerial responses to the existence of networks
In general two responses to the existence of policy networks can be distinguished
(Kickert et al. 1997). The first is aimed at the improvement of the strategic behaviour of
actors within networks and the quality of interaction between these actors. Within
policy network theory until recently, the main attention was given to this first response.
The implication of this first strategy is that policy networks are accepted as a fact of life.
Networks are there, and they are there to stay. The best you can do is to deal
adequately with them.
The second reaction does not treat policy networks as given. Due to profound
dissatisfaction with the implications of existing policy networks, this type of
response is aimed at changing policy networks, perhaps even abolishing them, or to
create new ones (compare, for instance, Marin and Mayntz 1991; Marsh and
Rhodes 1992).
Governments all over the world and especially in western democracies search for
new forms of governance or try to induce these by changing their relations with other
public and private partners. Examples are the ideas of joined-up government in the UK,
the introduction of the Private Finance Initiative and the attempts at modernizing local
government in this country. But also the initiatives for creating more autonomous
governmental organizations in many western countries (Pollitt et al. 2001) can be seen
as attempts to break through predominating, historically grown network relations.
Obviously governments in western democracies see interventions of institutional design
in which institutional characteristics in networks are changed as legitimate and effective
means of governance.
Attention for institutional design
We think these wide-spread strategies at changing the institutional features of policy
networks call for more scientific attention. Of course there are theoretical reasons for
this. In public administration and social science it is common knowledge that
institutions are durable and hard to change (compare Goodin 1996; March and Olsen
1989). Yet in practice many efforts to change institutions are undertaken. This raises
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questions such as: how is this possible, are these attempts as futile as theory suggests and
what are their theoretical implications? But there are also practical and normative
reasons for studying institutional design. Institutions are often considered to be the
result of enduring interaction processes by which actors have developed ways to
reconcile their conflicting interests. This institutional capital is not easily replaced by
newly designed arrangements.
Outline of this article
In this article we present a theoretical framework for the analysis of attempts at
institutional (re-)design in network-settings. This framework builds on concepts and
insights from policy network theory (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn
2004) but also on neo-institutional economics and the new institutionalism in social
sciences (Williamson 1985; Ostrom 1986; March and Olsen 1989; North 1990; Powel
and DiMaggio 1991; Nooteboom et al. 1997). The framework provides a way of
looking at networks as institutions and provides a way to identify and analyse
institutional design interventions. By this we can enhance our understanding of
institutional design and undertake research to assess the impact of institutional design
interventions.
In the next section we deal with the idea of networks as institutions and the role of
rules. We then discuss various strategies of institutional design (section 3). In section 4
we elaborate on the complex character of the process of institutional design, since these
interventions have to be achieved in bargaining games. We end with a sketch of a
research agenda for which the theoretical framework may be applied (section 5).
NETWORKS AS INSTITUTIONS: RULES AND THEIR STRUCTURING
Institutions actually form the social infrastructure of our behaviour. Without
institutions virtually every form of collective behaviour and collective action would
be impossible. If we were not able to fall back on fixed rules, norms and agreements,
which give our behaviour meaning, collective behaviour would be virtually impossible
due to the considerable transaction costs and collective action problems could hardly be
solved. Institutions thus often provide a source of stability and comprise a social
infrastructure, formed by the interaction of actors in the past. This means not only that
they are useful for determining behaviour and provide a handle for co-operation but
also that they are difficult to change because they carry the bias of previous interactions,
views and power relations.
Institutions are thus a two-edged sword: they enable interactions, provide stability
and certainty and form the basis on which actors’ trust may be founded. At the same
time they serve to ‘codify’ previous (unequal) power relations, of common opinions
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and permitted discussions and may thus obstruct or hamper reforms (March and Olson
1989; Ostrom 1990).
Rules as the heart of institutions: Ambiguity, formation and change
Rules form the heart of institutions. Many authors even consider rules as the
characteristic of institutions. For instance, Scharpf (1997: 38) describes institutions as
‘systems of rules that structure the course of actions that a set of actors may choose’.
Institutions are therefore in short sets of rules, which influence, guide and limit the
behaviour of actors. In this sense networks may be regarded as institutions. They are
patterns of social relationships between mutually dependent actors (Aldrich and
Whetten 1981; Marin and Mayntz 1991) but are at the same time systems of rules.
After all, networks are characterized by specific and unique sets of formal and
informal rules. Each network has its own history, in the course of which rules have been
formed and these in turn have undergone a development (March and Olsen 1989; Klijn
1996, 2001; Burns and Flam 1987; Scharpf 1997).
The rules of the network are ‘activated’ by the actors in separate games. This does
not mean, however, that rules are always clear or even fully known to the interacting
actors. Rules are often ambiguous and require translation in the interactions (March and
Olsen 1989). Just as a judge tries to interpret a specific case (offence) in the light of an
existing rule, an actor in the network tries to interpret the meaning of events in the
game based on the network rules that he is familiar with. So network rules influence the
interactions of the game by means of actors who apply rules in their actions.
The fact that network rules are activated in the game also explains why difficulties
frequently arise in games that cover more than one network. In games of this sort, after
all, different rules from different networks are activated which leads at the very least to
ambiguity (which rules apply and how should they be interpreted?) but may also result
in conflicts between different sets of rules (van Bueren et al. 2003). The behaviour of
actors in such situations often consists at least in part of determining and reaching
consensus on the rules that will apply.
Changes of rules
Although there are occasions when rules are consciously designed and decided upon,
rules are usually formed as a by-product during interactions. Rules may be the product
of conscious design behaviour by an actor – usually a public actor – but even then they
are only rules if the other actors in the network recognize them as such and keep to
them. This immediately provides a definition of the essential difference between social
and physical rules. Social rules, and thus also rules in networks, only remain in
existence if they are followed by actors and are actually complied with in concrete game
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behaviours. Rules that are broken by the actors, either consciously or unconsciously, or
are not (or no longer) complied with, lose their validity (Duintjer 1987; Burns and
Flam 1987).
Rules may change due to various conditions
. As a result of a conscious action (design/intervention) by an actor provided that
this intervention is perceived to be legitimate by other actors in the network and
is at least complied with. (Note that this is not necessarily in a literal sense. We
will return to this later.)
. As a result of reinterpretation by actors; if a number of actors start to interpret
existing rules in a different way (in terms of our example of the judge we could
say: create a different jurisprudence) rules will change.
. As a result of non-compliance or even conscious breaking of rules; if actors no
longer comply with rules or even consciously break them and this stance is
adopted by other actors and not followed up by effective negative sanctions,
rules will lose their meaning. This process will usually be accompanied by the
simultaneous formation of new rules (see van Buuren and Klijn 2004).
Types of rules in networks
Rules are thus gradually formed and changed. The next question we want to address,
however, is what it is exactly that regulate in networks and how can be analysed. To
put it another way: what types of rules are found in networks? In the literature we find
various classifications of rules (see, for example, Ostrom 1986; Burns and Flam 1987).1
In this article we assume a distinction between interaction rules and arena rules.
Interaction rules have a procedural character and tell actors what is and is not
permitted within a network. They modify behaviours within the context of the arena
rules.2 An overview of the two types of rules and examples can be found in Table 1.
Interaction rules may focus on the access to the network or the arena or on the
interactions within the game. Access rules determine how exclusive games are, how
actors are selected for particular games and which exit options they have. Other
interaction rules are (non) intervention rules, rules that regulate the availability and use
of information, and rules for dealing with conflict.
Arena rules are rules that provide the actors with a handle for determining the nature
of the network and arena in which they find themselves. They specify positions, realities
and pay-offs. They are thus rules that define the nature of a social practice. As such they
are at times barely recognizable as rules and are of an almost tautological character.
Arena rules have the character of what Searle, the English analytical philosopher, calls
structuring rules (Searle 1971; van Eemeren and Koning 1981). A structuring rule
defines when someone in a chess game has been placed in checkmate. Arena rules define
the nature of the game.
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Within arena rules three subsets of rules may be identified: reality rules, pay-off rules
and position rules. Reality rules specify primarily what constitutes good and bad
arguments, information and standards for actors. Professional codes regarding
behaviour (e.g. physicians) or products (e.g. good-quality housing) play an important
role here. In addition, arena rules relate to which pay-off rules (financial but also non-
material) and which position rules in the network are important. Figure 1 gives an
example of network rules in this case rules within the Dutch fishery network.
Network rules: Structures of power
Rules are a codification of specific characteristics of networks. They determine such
characteristics as the closeness of networks (by means of the interaction rules that
determine which actors are admitted in the game), the language that is used in networks
and last but not least the power and resource dependencies in networks.
Power is in essence the perception of actors in the network of another actor’s
influencing potential. This perception is regulated by position rules that determine
whether or not an actor is respected. But this perception is also determined by what is
permitted in a network. In short, it is also dependent on the access options (which
actors are, consciously or unconsciously excluded) and the mode of communicating
about (policy) issues (which items, judgements, etc. are taken for granted because they
are part of the actors’ identity). Thus, they rest on the product and identity rules of the
network. This last dimension of power is usually referred to as mobilization of bias
Table 1: Types of rules in networks
Description Aspects Examples
Interaction rules Rules which regulate
interactions in the
game; i.e. rules which
specify what is and is
not permitted in games
between actors
Access to policy game – exclusivity
– selection
– exit options
Interaction in policy game – (non-)intervention
– provision of information
– conflict
Arena rules Rules which regulate the
game setting; i.e. rules
which specify what type
of game and network is
under discussion in any
given case
Reality – identity of actors
– product rules
Pay-off – status
– evaluation criteria
Positions – status
– powers
Source: Adapted from Klijn (1996, 2001).
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(Bachrach and Bararatz 1962). Through an analysis of these dimensions of the network
via rules an insight may also be gained into this grimmer side of institutions (Moe 1990;
Knight 1992). Figure 2 gives some illustration of the power dimension of network
rules. We use again the network rules of the Dutch fishery network as an example.
The last observation about power draws attention to the fact that the structure of the
network, the sets of rules, is made up of interactions and choices from the past and thus
also of the power relations from the past. A struggle about changing rules, and that
Figure 1: Rules in Dutch fishery network
Source: van Buuren and Klijn (2004).
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means for each attempt at institutional design, is also a power struggle (see Klijn 2001).
In addition to enabling and facilitating interactions by reducing strategic uncertainty and
transaction costs, network rules therefore also have a ‘dark’ side: the institutionalization
of distributive advantages and the exclusion of certain actors, interests and issues.
Institutions are not neutral. They simultaneously fulfil both a positive and a negative
function: they effect a stable interaction environment but also bring about non-decision
making and mobilization of bias. Whenever institutions fall short in the first function or
become dysfunctional due to the second, there are grounds for institutional design.
A definition of institutional design
After dealing with networks as institutions and placing rules at the heart of institutions it
is possible to give a clearer description of the concept institutional design. Institutional
design is aimed at deliberate changes in institutional characteristics of networks. So it has
to be separated from gradual changes in these characteristics which always occur because
actors in networks slowly adapt institutional characteristics over time or because
institutional arrangements lose their regulative power. These emergent, sometimes even
unconscious processes of (de-)institutionalization are more or less by-products of the
strategic games actors play (Giddens 1984; Ostrom 1990). They are tied to
(re)interpretations of actors (creating gradually different understandings of the rules)
or more or less conscious ignoring or changing the application of rules.
Figure 2: Power in the rules of the fishery network
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Institutional design, in contrast, refers both to the activity of trying to change the
institutional features of policy networks, as to the content of the institutional change that
is aimed for.
Furthermore, we need to clarify what we mean by institutional characteristics. We
have defined institutions as ‘systems of rules that structure the course of actions that a
set of actors may choose’ (Scharpf 1997: 38). So institutional design is the deliberate
attempt to change the set of rules that structures interactions within policy networks.
These rules can be formal or informal.
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN STRATEGIES
Institutional design is first of all aimed at changing rules. To achieve this, however,
highly diverse institutional design strategies are possible. In this section we will first
look at the possible options for intervention available to institutional design: what type
of rules (and thus network characteristics) are the interventions aimed at? Subsequently
we look at the way in which the rules could be changed.
Directions of institutional design: Which rules change?
Various management strategies aimed at changing rules may be distinguished. These
strategies may be classified into three categories:
(1) Strategies aimed at the network composition; these are strategies, which focus
on changing or influencing the composition of the network. This
intervention is based on the premise that the composition of the network
(and changes made in the composition) has an influence on the interactions
(and thus outcomes) occurring within it. There are various ways in which
the composition of the network may be changed. For example, strategies
aimed at consolidating or changing actors’ positions or adding new actors.
However, strategies may also be aimed at changing the access rules for
actors or at influencing the network as a whole by promoting network
formation, and self-regulation, or modifications to the system. The various
strategies range from relatively light interventions, like laying down actors’
positions which only confirms achieved and existing relation patterns, to
more encompassing interventions like system modifications (see Table 2).
An intervention like system modification not only involves a larger variety
of rules affected, but also influences more deeply the position and
identities of actors and mostly creates more resistance (see also section 5).
Table 2 shows which sort of rules function as intervention points for each
strategy.
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(2) Strategies aimed at the network outcomes; these are strategies that try to influence
the standards or the logic of costs and benefits in a sustainable way so that
games within networks evolve in a different way because other strategic
choices are made. The point of intervention here is not the actors as in the
previous set of strategies but their choices. This means the sustainable
influencing of actors’ strategic choices and the outcomes resulting from them.
The most important institutional design strategies in this category are strategies
to change the pay-off structure (financial or other rewards that are connected
to strategies and decisions), to change professional codes (standards by which
actors see their professional activities and identities) and strategies that are
aimed at changing evaluation criteria (standards by which actors judge the
achieved outcomes). The two last types of strategies are closely connected.
(3) Strategies aimed at network interactions; these are strategies that try to influence
the interactions between actors in a sustainable way. These strategies are aimed
at influencing rules, which regulate the process in networks and in this way try
to facilitate interactions, to put them in a framework or to make linkages.
Strategies in this category include developing conflict settlement mechanisms
(which regulate conflicts between actors) or introducing certain procedures
into interactions (and fix certain interaction or decision sequences in the
interaction). But strategies such as certification (standards of quality attached to
the characteristics of an actor or his relation to other actors) or influencing
supervisory relationships also fall into this category.
Table 2 shows the strategies, which have been discussed earlier and shows also to
which type of rules a certain strategy is aimed.3 For this we use the same typology of
rules that have been presented in section 2.
The table shows a wide variety of institutional interventions and provides a
conceptual framework to analyse the type of strategies we can observe in reality.
An example of institutional interventions is given in Figure 4 where we discuss
some interventions of the European Union in Dutch Fishery networks. This example
shows that different strategies can be used at the same time.
Institutional design for changing of institutions: Implementing strategies
We have shown earlier where institutional design strategies may be aimed at. This
leaves us with the interesting question of how to implement these strategies. In line
with what was said in section 2 about the changing of rules we may distinguish two
important ways in which institutional design strategies may be implemented:
. Direct intervention in rules; interventions may be aimed directly at changing
rules. This is the case with, for example, legislation (or changes in legislation),
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with attempts to change informal established rules. The earlier example of the
European Union intervening in the national fishery networks is a clear example
of this. But direct intervention in rules can also be achieved by private regulation
or by regulation, which is achieved in joint decision making between public and
private actors. An example of a private agreement is that of the Tabaksblat
commission in the Netherlands which has established rules on pay-offs for top
managers in response to the discussion on the ‘self-enrichment’ of managers via
the provision of shares. In the USA, too, there is a discussion underway about
sharper controls on companies in response to a series of fraud scandals, the most
well known of which is the fraud involving ENRON. Drawing up rules of this
sort directly affects actors’ options for behaviour and regulates, for example, the
method of information provision.
Figure 3: Institutional design strategies of the European Union in fishery politics
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. Indirect interventions via the influencing of perceptions and the creation of long-
term changes in interaction patterns. If we assume that rules may also be
changed as a result of actors changing their strategies, interpreting rules
differently or no longer following rules, institutional design strategies may also
be aimed at bringing about sustainable changes to actors’ perceptions and
strategies and by that achieving changes in rules in the longer run. We refer to
this as ‘reframing’. Reframing involves the bringing about of major changes in
actors’ perceptions so that they interpret situations in a different way and
(drastically) adjust their behaviour. Established habits and things that are taken
for granted are thus broken down enabling new lines of behaviour (and new
common practices regulated by rules).
Reframing strategies can have different forms like using administrative stories (the
‘Third way’, stimulating free competition, etc.), setting up prestigious policy
Table 2: Strategies to influence and change rules in networks
Arena rules Interaction rules
Strategy
Identity/
product
rules
Pay-off
rules
Position
rules
Access
rules
Interaction
rules
Network composition
1. Change actor positions X
2. Lay down actor positions (X) X
3. Add actors (X) X
4. Change access rules for games X
5. Influence network formation (X) X
6. Promote self-regulation X (X) (X) X
7. System modifications
(e.g. market forces,
reorganizations)
X X (X) X X
Network outcomes
1. Change evaluation criteria X (X)
2. Influence pay-off structure (X) X
3. Influence professional codes X (X)
Network interactions
1. Conflict regulation (X) X
2. Change interaction procedures (X) X
3. Certification X X
4. Change supervisory relationships (X) X X
documents or providing sensitizing concepts (agencies, autonomizing). Administrative
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Figure 4: Changing actors and access rules
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stories may be set up which pave the way for change. The concept of ‘the Third Way’
as the Labour Government in the UK tells it is, besides many other things, a story,
which functions as a vehicle to change policy and minds of actors.
Administrative stories like ‘sensitizing’ concepts highlight particular problems and
propagate particular solutions. A concept such as autonomizing, for example, focuses
attention on a specific formulation of the problem (there is too little distance between
policy and implementation and this is why implementation ends up being inefficient) and
proposes solutions (greater efficiency can be achieved through self-reliance and
performance indicators). In short, reframing strategies such as administrative stories and
sensitizing concepts, but also others such as discussing major policy documents or
utilizing crisis situations, aim to bring about sustainable changes in actors’ thinking and
strategic behaviour and via this route try to achieve a reinterpretation of rules or the
forming of new rules.
Reframing strategies are often used in combination with direct interventions.
Administrative stories thus accompany concrete measures such as the self-reliance of
sections of departments, the introduction of performance contracts, etc. In short,
institutional design in networks is often a combination of direct interventions in rules
and attempts to reframe.
It will be clear that reframing in combination with direct intervention in rules does
not always result in clear-cut outcomes. Institutional design as we will elaborate in the
next section is often complex and also realized in complex interaction processes with
unexpected and unforeseen consequences. The choice of the (mix of) institutional
design strategies will probably depend on three main factors:
(1) The institutional characteristics of networks; rules of the networks will
probably make certain strategies more likely than others (because of used and
proven ways of doing, of power differences or other characteristics that are
connected to the set of rules in a certain network).
(2) Imitation behaviour and dominant discourses in or outside the network; this
idea of institutional behaviour as imitation or as shaped by dominant discourses
is already elaborated by other writers (see Powell and DiMaggio 1991 on the
idea of imitation).
(3) Strategic choices and options; just as all interactions in networks institutional
design strategies are subject to strategic choice and considerations. This
strategic aspect is elaborated in the next section.
THE COMPLEX CHARACTER OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROCESS
Even though institutional rules are not static and are subject to constant change, they
are not easy to influence via conscious design activities even though the discussion of
various strategies in the former section may suggest this.
154 Public Management Review
In the following we will argue that, just as policy making is not so much an
intellectual design activity but a bargaining game, the same is true for institutional
design. The game of institutional design is even more complicated, because decisions
upon institutional (re-)design have to be implemented within the interaction games of
networks (Blom-Hansen 1997). It is there that new rules are adopted and aligned with
existing practices.
Institutional design as a bargaining game at the institutional level
Institutional design games differ from ‘ordinary’ policy games within networks in that
they are aimed at changing institutional rules. A further difference is that these games
often are played at the institutional level of the network, sometimes even in separate
‘arenas’ in which decisions on formal institutional rules are taken (Kiser and Ostrom
1982; O’Toole 1988). Formal changes in law for instance can only be made by legislative
bodies of governments. This institutional design game itself is guided by a specific set of
rules that may differ from the rules that are used within networks. In case of formal laws
certain legislative procedures and decision rules have to be followed. Actors who are
dominant within a network may not automatically participate in this game. The
complicated and lengthy procedures and uncertain institutional environment reduce the
manageability of this institutional design game: it is a negotiation game in a garbage can-
type context (Allison 1971; Cohen et al. 1972; March and Olsen 1983, 1989).
Although the institutional design game often is played in separate institutional arenas,
it is not unrelated to the games that take place in policy networks. Some network actors
will have easier access to institutional arenas than others. And some will be in a better
position to organize a lobby to influence the decision making in this arena or to form a
coalition with influential parties who operate in these arenas.
However, not all institutional design attempts take place in separate arenas. Also
within the day-to-day arenas of the network actors can try to change the rules that guide
the players’ behaviour. Institutional design is not only about changing formal rules, but
may also be aimed at the informal ‘rules in use’ within policy networks. In practice it
may be hard to distinguish ‘ordinary’ strategies at the interaction level from strategies
aimed at changing institutional rules. But as far as institutional design is undertaken in a
separate arena, it is important to remember that this game is not equally accessible to all
players in the network.
Another important conclusion is that proposed institutional designs are not rational
designs. They are the result of the process of pushing and pulling between the parties
involved. Policy assumptions about the effectiveness of institutional designs play a role, but
so do the power relations between conflicting coalitions. And also coincidence plays an
important role, since the arenas at the institutional level in which decisions on formal rules
are taken, are far more politicized and open to environmental influences than the
depoliticized and embedded arenas of the policy network.
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The implementation of institutional designs within network arenas
How formal decisions in institutional arenas aimed at changing network rules will work
out in the games played within networks is highly uncertain. After all, formal rules are
not identical to the institutional rules-in-use within networks. Formal decisions may, in
the short term, break down institutional practices, liquidate organizations, establish
new ones, adjust resources, change common outlooks and so forth. But that does not
mean that a new institutional practice will immediately be established. Even if a fairly
comprehensive institutional blueprint is introduced, in practice these new institutional
rules will have to be interpreted, accepted, applied and internalized. Attempts to
implement new rules are often obstructed by the resistance of actors who have a vested
interest in the existing rules. As a result institutional innovations are not or only partly
implemented or implemented in a deviant way. But even when new rules are accepted,
their effective implementation requires a gradual process of learning by doing. Given
the complexity of interaction processes, a lot of unforeseen circumstances will arise
which parties must learn to deal with.
Laying down new institutional rules in as much detail as possible is not the
solution to these implementation problems. The more detailed they are formulated
the more room they provide for actors to interpret these in their own way and the
greater the distance between formal rules and rules-in-use. This sketch of the process
of institutional design shows that we are dealing with a complex undertaking of which
the outcomes are hard to predict (Goodin 1996; North 1990; Knight 1992). The
example in Figure 5 shows how institutional design interventions may have their own
unforeseen effects.
Institutional design as trajectory instead of blue-print
The complex, multi-level character of the institutional design game implies that both
the way design processes evolve and their impacts are highly uncertain. The
consequence is that designs are by definition imperfect and should be seen rather as
the start of a trajectory of institutional change than as a definitive design. The
strategic answers of parties to institutional design strategies of one party are only
partially predictable. The consequence is that unexpected and possibly undesired
effects will occur. These will call for further adaptation and thus for new decisions on
strategies for institutional design. As a result the proposed institutional changes will
be adapted. But also these new proposals will have shortcomings, which have to be
addressed.
An example of this mechanism of repetitive institutional (re-)design is offered by
attempts to liberalize public service provision. Unexpected strategic reactions from the
players involved restrict competition and endanger public interests. After the first
round of institutional innovations, new forms of regulation have to be introduced to
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cope with these effects. But seldom forms of regulation introduced in a second round of
institutional design, are effective at the first shot. So a third round of adapting the
institutional (re-)design is necessary.
Figure 5: Example: Unforeseen impacts: free market policy and the fishery network
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Again, institutional design implies rather the starting of a protracted and relatively
undetermined process than the intellectual design of an institutional blueprint. Figure 6
offers a visualization of the complex and multi-level character of institutional design in
which actors, involved in network games, try to influence decisions made at the
institutional arena, while formal rules decided upon in these institutional arenas are
transposed in network games into new ‘rules-in-use’ which eventually will guide the
behaviour of parties within this game. At each step the process can be disturbed.
CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AS SUBJECT OF RESEARCH
Institutional design is not a simple activity. The nature of institution design, its process
and its impact are not very well understood. Institutional design is a process of pushing
and pulling with uncertain results. Often, long-established certainties, which have
proved their value in the past are changed or removed, while no one knows for sure
how this will affect their functioning or what will replace them. These uncertainties,
however, in no way restrain politicians and policy makers from taking initiatives for
institutional design.
So there is every reason to devote more attention, both theoretical and empirical,
to institutional design. Although various attempts have already been made on this
front (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) the research into institutional design is still
in its infancy. In this article we have presented a theoretical framework, which
could be used to conduct research into institutional design interventions. By
applying the types of rules and interventions, institutional design strategies can be
Figure 6: The complex multi-level character of the institutional design game
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compared and analysed. Using the theoretical insights on the way in which
institutional design is deployed the effects of institutional design could be mapped.
This could be done by mapping the specific path of changes initiated by institutional
design strategies, but also by specifying the conditions under which the reform
process proceeds. At the same time, the effects of the institutional design strategies,
which have been set in motion, should be looked into. Research of this sort would
give us more insight into the possibilities, limitations and pitfalls of institutional
design in networks.
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NOTES
1 A well-known essay is by Ostrom (1986) on position rules, entry and exit rules, scope rules, authority rules,
aggregation rules, information rules and pay-off rules. The disadvantage is that some important rules, like
rules that determine professional standards or identity of actors, are missing.
2 They resemble the idea of regulating rules (see Searle 1971; Duintjer 1977).
3 For a more extensive discussion of the strategies see Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: ch. 10).
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